ارتباط هزینه‌های نمایندگی و سلب منافع سهامداران اقلیت با تاکید بر نقش کیفیت گزارشگری مالی

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار گروه حسابداری، واحد تبریز، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تبریز، ایران،

2 کارشناس ارشد حسابداری، واحد مرند، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، مرند، ایران،

چکیده

تئوری نمایندگی بیان می‌کند که هزینه‌های نمایندگی ناشی از تضاد منافع بین مدیران و سهامداران می‌باشد که ممکن است پیامدهایی مانند سلب منافع سهامداران اقلیت را در پی داشته باشد. در این مقاله با بررسی ارتباط بین هزینه‌های نمایندگی و سلب منافع سهامداران اقلیت، با تاکید بر نقش کیفیت گزارشگری مالی، چالش‌های پیش رو مورد بررسی قرار گرفته است. جامعۀ آماری پژوهش، شامل شرکت‌های پذیرفته‌شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران بوده و از میان آنها، تعداد 102 شرکت، طی سال‌های 1389 تا 1394 به‌عنوان نمونه، انتخاب و مورد پژوهش واقع شده است. برای سنجش هزینه‌های نمایندگی از تعامل شاخص کیوتوبین و جریان‌های نقد آزاد، برای اندازه‌گیری سلب منافع سهامداران اقلیت از مجموع شاخص هرفیندال برای تمرکز مالکیت و معاملات با اشخاص وابسته و برای اندازه‌گیری کیفیت گزارشگری مالی از مدل فرانسیس و همکاران استفاده گردیده است. برای آزمون فرضیه‌های پژوهش، از مدل رگرسیون چندمتغیره استفاده شده است. نتایج پژوهش نشان می‌دهد، بین هزینه‌های نمایندگی و سلب منافع سهامداران اقلیت، ارتباط معنادار و مثبت وجود دارد. همچنین نتایج نشان می‌دهد که کیفیت گزارشگری مالی بر ارتباط بین هزینه‌های نمایندگی و سلب منافع سهامداران اقلیت شرکت‌ها، تاثیر معنادار و منفی دارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Relationship between Agency Costs and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders’ Interests with Emphasis on the Role of Financial Reporting Quality

نویسندگان [English]

  • Younes Badavar Nahandi 1
  • Firooz Nezari Abr 2
  • Roghayeh Dehghan 2
1 Associate professor, Department of Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Tabriz, Iran
2 Department of Accounting, Marand Branch, Islamic Azad University, Marand, Iran
چکیده [English]

Agency theory states that agency cost is resulted from conflict of interests between managers and shareholders that there may be consequences such as Expropriation of Minority Shareholders’ Interests interest. This study examines the relationship between agency costs and expropriation of minority shareholders’ interests with emphasis on the role of financial reporting quality among listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. This study in terms of target is applied and the method is Ex post facto research. The sample used in our research includes 102 firms listed on the Tehran stock exchange during the period 2011-2016. In this study, to measure the agency costs and Expropriation of Minority Shareholder interests, it was used the interaction between of the Q-Tobin index and free cash flows and the summation of a Herfindal index for ownership concentration and the related party transactions respectively. Also, Francis et al (2005) model is used to measure financial reporting quality. In this study to test the hypothesis, multivariate regression model was used. The results of this study show that there is a positive and significant relationship between agency costs and expropriation of minority shareholders. Also, the results show that, financial reporting quality have a negative and significant impact on the relationship between agency costs and expropriation of minority shareholders’ interests.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Agency Costs
  • Expropriation of Minority Shareholders Interests
  • financial reporting quality

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