عنوان مقاله [English]
If the percentage of institutional shareholders increase, the moral hazard of company and then underpricing of IPO would decrease, because institutional shareholders provide certain requirements related volume, price and mechanism of IPO that can effect on of IPO underpricing. IPO is done by companies that market has little know about management and ownership of these companies. Outside investors has little information at time of IPO about these companies relative to other companies. In contrast, inside shareholders has more information. Thus there is asymmetry information between issuing company and potential investors.The purpose of this study is that to explain the role of asymmetric information on IPO Underpricing and the role of moral hazard as one of the most important aspects of Information Asymmetry on IPO Underpricing should be determined. The researchers measured information asymmetry by various factors such as underwriter reputation, ownership structure and the stock market that the firm be offered, and moral hazard is measured by management ownership during the lockup length. Study empirical show that moral hazard and asymmetric information is the most important factors of affecting on IPO Underpricing.